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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF

THE

STATE

OF

UTAH

LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Plaintiff, Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,

vs.

No. 9945

RALPH W. FARRAR and HEL.EN R.
FARRAR, his wife, and
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 9946

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action by Van Zyverdens to collect $18,000.00 loss of
anticipated profits from proposed cattle ranch operation
allegedly prevented because of seller's alleged failure to
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furnish Van Zyverdens with the use of $3,190.00 and
action by Seagull against Van Zyverdens for restitution
of premises, damages for breach of contract, attorney fees
and triple damages for unlawful detainer. No part of the
$55,000.00 purchase price, taxes, water assessments, etc.
of ranch have been paid, either to sellers or into court,
although Van Zyverdens have had possession of farm
since September, 1960. Van Zyverdens contend that performance of their obligations was excused and postponed
until litigation is concluded. Van Zyverdens also ask for
specific performance requiring Seagull to convey the
ranch to them.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court entered judgment of no cause of
action against all parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Seagull seeks reversal of judgment of no cause of action
on Seagull's claims, restitution of farm, damages for
breach of contract, attorney fees, interest, and/or triple
damages for unlawful detainer and judgment affirming
the decision of no cause of action against Van Zyverdens.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in Seagull's appeal
brief on file herein is incorporated by reference.
The voluminous statement of alleged facts contained
in Van Zyverdens' brief are largely unsupported by the
evidence and record and are for the most part vigorously
disputed by Seagull, however, Seagull feels it necessary
to present the true facts and issues in some detail. The
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correct facts with respect to some of the more important
disputed statements contained in Van Zyverdens' statement of facts are as follows:
1. Is intent material to issues:
The alleged "intent" of the parties, claimed by Van
Zyverdens, to the effect that the parties intended that the
pennission granted in exhibit 1 (R. 227) for Van Zyverdens to "exchange" the milk base and milking equipment
sold with the farm for " ... livestock or horses of equal
value, remaining security for the period of 2 years ... " is
a warranty and guarantee by the seller that they would
assume obligation to enable the "sale or exchange" to be
made, is untrue, is immaterial to the issues in the case
(see pre-trial order R. 181-182) and constitutes an attempt: (a) to re-write the pre-trial order, (b) to add to
and vary the terms of the contract by parol evidence and
(c) an attempt to reform the contract without pleading
fraud or mistake or asking for reformation by (d) calling
their attempted reformation an interpretation of the
"intent" of the parties.
Farrar testified that he was not aware that Van Zyverden had added language about exchange of milk base
when he executed the real estate contract (R. 580-581).
\ran Zyverden himself testified that there was nothing
said about the transfer of the milk base at the time the
contract was signed (R. 51); that he never discussed with
the sellers his present claim to the effect that he would
be unable to pay for the ranch if the milk base could not
be exchanged (R. 52); that before he signed the contract
he did not consider that he would be unable to perform
his obligations under the contract if the milk base could
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not be exchanged (R. 538) and that he wanted permission
to exchange the milk base in the event that he could not
make the grade with a dairy operation (R. 538).
It is obvious after examining Van Zyverden's own
testimony that all of the talk in Van Zyverdens' brief
about "intent of_ the parties," "conditions precedent" and
specific discussions and agreements as to exact profits to
be realized from the beef operation as the only operation
contempla.ted by the parties when the contract was
signed, is incorrect and not supported by th~ record. The
lack of evidence to support their wild assertions concerning intent, conditions precedent, damages, etc. is very
apparent from the absence of citations ~o the place in the
record where such evidence is found.
2. Had dairy been a failing operation:

Representations by Van Zyverdens that undisputed
evidence shows business failures by five previous occupants is untrue. The only evidence of failure to make a
profit by Van Camp, Mecham, Collier or Bowers, the
persons who received possession of the ranch from
Farrars, is failure ofVan Camp to make a profit, however,
Farrar testified that the reason that Van Camp failed to
make a profit was because he was only on the ranch for
five days (R. 572). Aluminum Roofing Company acquired
possession from Bowers, defaulted, and Farrar repossessed the ranch immediately before Van Zyverdens
acquired possession. There is no evidence to show the
reason why Aluminum Roofing Company defaulted and
accordingly the statement that the ranch had a history of
business failure is simply not supported by the record.
See additional discussion under point IV.
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3. Miscellaneous incorrect statements alleged as facts
in Van Zyverdens' brief:
The following allegations in Van Zyverdens' statement
of facts are untrue and unsupported by the record:
(a) The allegation that the parties agreed that the
ranch would "continue" to be unsuccessful as a dairy,
(b) that the ranch could only be operated profitably as a
beef operation, (c) that no other type of operation
was contemplated by the parties, (d) that the conversion
to a beef operation was impossible except by sale or
exchange of milk base and equipment to provide Van
Zyverdens with working capital, (e) that the seller understood and agreed that payment of the purchase price
could only be made with profits from beef operations
since. (f) and that the parties were aware that Van
Zyverden, himself, had no funds to go into the beef
business. These alleged facts are discussed below:

4. Was previous dairy operation successful:
It is apparent from the record that the dairy operations
had been at least moderately successful, that even Van
Zyverdens operated the property as a dairy farm (R.
540) and that the milk base and milking equipment
acquired in connection with the dairy operation were
valuable assets (R. 54 7, 637).

5. Did parties contemplate a horse, sheep or beef operation:
The contract itself (R. 227) indicates that Van Zyverdens contemplated some type of "livestock" or "horse"
,~enture on the ranch at the time that the contract was
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executed. Van Zyverden testified that "My planning
instead of to run dairy cattle there to have beef cattle
there, or sheep or horses especially." (Emphasis added)
(R. 539).
6. Did parties compute anticipated profits:
The foregoing testimony is clearly contrary to the
basic premises of the Van Zyverden case, to-wit: (a) that
the parties contemplated no venture except a beef operation on the ranch and (b) to theory of the tender of
proof as to alleged anticipated profits from the beef operation and (c) contrary to the allegation that the figures
mentioned in the offer of proof were exactly the figures
allegedly discussed by the parties and specifically agreed
upon as the profits to be made by Van Zyverdens from
the beef operation. Obviously the parties did not specifically agree upon the figures suggested by Van Zyverdens for a beef operation since the beef operation was
only one of several suggested operations for the ranch.
Even if the parties tried to anticipate the gains or losses
from such a speculative venture, their estimates would
be vague and uncertain and would not for rna proper
basis for measuring damages.
7. Did parties agree that milk base would finance Van
Zyverdens' beef operation:
The contention that the sellers knew that Van Zyverdens had no funds to finance the alleged beef operation on
the ranch and that they knew that payments could not be
made except from profits is contrary to reason and common sense. Van Zyverdens would have the Court believe
that Farrars were so anxious to sell the ranch to Van
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Zyverdens with no down payment, with nothing to be
paid for over a year and then only from profits, if any,
realized from operation of the farm, that they were willing to finance Van Zyverdens' operation by not only permitting Van Zyverdens to sell the milk base and equipment included in the sale, but undertook to "warrant and
guarantee" that the sale of the base and equipment could
be accomplished.
8. Does contract permit a "sale" of milk base:
The contract (R. 226-227) permits an "exchange" and
not a "sale" of the milk base. No offer of exchange of the
milk base or equipment was ever presented by Van
Zyverden (R. 553-554). The milk equipment could be
exchanged at any time without restriction (R. 226-227,
230-231).
9. Was exchange of milk base a condition precedent to

Van Zyverdens' obligations:
Van Zyverden testified that he did not say anything to
anyone about not being able to perform his obligations
under the purchase contract if he had any difficulty or
delay in transferring the milk base (R. 539, L. 11-18) and
that, at the time that he prepared the purchase contract
(R. 226-227), he did not think that transferability of the
milk base was sufficiently important to put a time limit
on its transfer (R. 539, L. 19-22).
The only statement in the record which even discusses
the liberal terms of the purchase of the farm is a vague
statement, by Van Zyverden, that he had no money himself and that he was concerned about the liberal terms
being offered him by Farrar (R. 503-504), which testi-
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mony obviously referred to Van Zyverdens obtaining
possession of the farm with no down payment, not to the
wild and wholly unsupported contentions of Van Zyverdens to the effect that they would not have to make any
payments on the purchase price except from profits and,
in effect, that if the milk base could not be exchanged at
all that Van Zyverdens would be excused from paying for
the ranch at all. (See Van Zyverden brief, Page 36.)
10. Did delay in exchanging milk base prevent beef

operation:
Had Van Zyverden completed the proposed sale of the
milk base to Peart he would have had $3,190.00 (R. 547,
L. 27-30) available to him in the spring of 1961 (R. 21, L.
16-20). Van Zyverdens' contention that they were prevented from going into beef business by the transfer of
the milk base being delayed until June 15, 1962, is
obviously incorrect since Van Zyverdens had sufficient
funds or credit to purchase 25 milk cows in March of
1961, which obviously cost more than the $3,190.00, and
probably cost about $450.00 each or a total of about
$11,250.00 (R. 611, L. 16-20, R. 612, L. 17-19). Beef cattle
were generally available on the market and no one
stopped Van Zyverdens from purchasing beef cattle for
the ranch (R. 557, L. 18-22).
11. Van Zyverdens elected to operate a dairy:

Obviously the alleged delay in exchanging the milk
base for cattle was not the reason that Van Zyverdens
elected to go into the dairy business instead of the beef
business in the spring of 1961. It is important to note that
in his letter of March 3, 1961 (R. 232) concerning ship-
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ping milk to Hiland Dairy, no mention was made of selling
or exchanging the milk base. Obviously Van Zyverdens
at that time had elected to use the base to permit them to
sell milk from their 25 cows instead of attempting a sale
of the milk base itself.
12. Inadequacy of offer of proof:
There is no suggestion in the record, offer of proof, or
Van Zyverdens' brief, that operating expenses, labor, feed
costs, possible loss from disease or other causes, etc. were
discussed. There is nothing in the record or offer of proof
from which the Court could determine the net profit that
Van Zyverden expected to make from this new, highly
speculative, proposed beef venture. Even if the milk base
at $3,190.00 (R. 547) and equipment at $1,850.00 (R. 524,
637) provided sufficient funds (approximately $5,000.00)
to purchase 100 head of beef animals weighing 300 pounds
each (R. 525) in the spring, it would be impossible for
them to operate through the summer and pay expenses of
operation if in fact they had no other funds available.
Certainly they would have been doomed to failure before
they began. If we examine the proposed venture a little
closer we can see how ridiculous their offer of proof
actually is. 100 head of animals at 300 pounds each would
weigh a total of 30,000 pounds. If they were purchased for
$5,000.00 this would mean that the purchase price would
be 16% cents per pound rather than the 25 cents per
pound which Van Zyverdens allege (without support in
the record) that they could realize for weight gain. If, on
the other hand, the correct price of beef is 25 cents per
pound, it would have cost $7,500.00 to purchase the 100
head of cattle, and Van Zyverdens would have been
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$2,500.00 short of having enough money to purchase the
100 head. If Van Zyverdens were able to borrow the
$2,500.00 (they deny that funds were available to them)
and to repay it in the fall, from the sale of animals, to
enable them to buy the entire 100 head and in fact the
animals gained the full 2 pounds per day for the full 180
days suggested by Van Zyverdens, and they had no losses
of animals, they would have only $9,000.00 available from
the operation to pay the annual contract payment due of
$6,334.17 (R. 33, 288), the property taxes of $397.82, the
water assessments of $333.98, or a net of $1,934.03 would
have been left to absorb and pay all other costs and
expenses including labor, feed, repairs, power, gasoline,
supplies, telephone, travel expense, seed, harvesting hay
and grain, loss from accident or disease, and the multitude of other expenses incidental to such an operation.
To make enough profit from the operation to make the
payment of $6,334.17 on the ranch (R. 33, 288) alone,
would require a 127% profit on the $5,000.00 investment
and in excess of a 70% profit on gross income from the
operation ($6,334.17 -=- $9,000.00 == 70.38% return required to make payment). The $5,000.00 invested in cattle
could not be used to make the annual payment because
the contract expressly states that the cattle are to remain
as security for a period of two years (R. 226-227). Van
Zyverdens allege that, in addition to paying expenses and
making the payment on the purchase price, they expected
to earn a small profit for themselves from the venture
(R. 525). I am certain that, if we could make a 127%
return on our investment by raising beef cattle, we would
all be out raising beef cattle.
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Van Zyverden allegedly paid $5,779.75 in operating ex-

penses (R. 221) and $4,412.49 for repairs, maintenance,
etc. (R. 220) during this period, so funds must have been
available to Van Zyverdens, contrary to the assertions in
their brief. This also gives some indication of part of the
operating costs which could have been reasonably expected to be incurred in a beef operation and clearly
demonstrates that little or no profit would have been
realized from the proposed beef operation, therefore payment of the taxes, water assessments and the annual
contract payment could not have been from profits, as
alleged by Van Zyverdens in their brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
VAN ZYVERDENS' CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO FILE BOND FOR
COSTS.
Rule 73(c), URCP, reads in part as follows:
" (c) BOND ON APPEAL. At the time of filing the

notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with such
notice a bond for costs on appeal, unless such bond is
waived in writing by the adverse party, or unless an
affidavit as hereinafter described is filed ... " (Emphasis added)
Seagull has not waived the requirement that Van
Zyverdens file a bond for costs, no impecunious affidavit
has been filed, and accordingly Van Zyverdens are not
excused from filing an appeal cost bond. Van Zyverdens
have not filed a bond as required by Rule 73 (c) and
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accordingly their cross-appeal has not been perfected and
should be dismissed. This question has been before the
Court on numerous occasions, and the rule is well established that where respondent or appellant filed no undertaking, or a pauper affidavit, or unless same is waived by
adverse party, the appeal will be dismissed. Buttrey v.
Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 U. 39, 45, 300 P. 1040; Cook
v. Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co., 7 U. 416, 27 P. 5;
Provo Reservoir Co. v. Tanner, 68 U. 21, 249 P. 118; Moser
v. Lundahl, 97 U. 222, 92 P.2d 340; Johnston v. Geary, 84
U. 47, 33 P.2d 757.
Appeal cost bonds are required for cross-appeals in the
same manner as for other appeals, and the failure of a
cross-appellant to file a cost bond invalidates the crossappeal. Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., supra.
POINT II
VAN ZYVERDENS' CROSS-APPEAL IS VOID BECAUSE RULE 74(b), URCP IS INVALID.
Rule 74 (b) purports to permit a party to cross-appeal
without filing a notice of appeal after the time for appealing has expired. Prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, no statutory procedure existed which
permitted a cross-appeal, except by filing a notice of
appeal in the same manner as was required for other
appeals.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to authority delegated to
it by 78-2-4, UCA, 1953, which reads in part as follows:
RULES-MAKING POWER.-The Supreme Court
of the state of Utah has power to prescribe, alter and
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revise, by rules, for all courts of the state of Utah ...
the practice and procedure in all civil and criminal
actions and proceedings, including rules of evidence
therein .... Such rules may not abridge, enlarge or
modify the substantive rights of any litigant . . ."
(Emphasis added)
Rule 82. URCP, further limits the scope of the rules,
which rule reads as follows:

"These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state or the venue
of actions therein.'' (Emphasis added)
Rule 74 (b) purports to permit the filing of a crossappeal after the time for filing of an appeal has otherwise
expired. Under the law in existence prior to the adoption
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal or cross-appeal
filed after the statutory time for filing of a notice of appeal
had expired. Christiansen v. Los Angeles and S. L. R. Co.,
77 U. 85, 106, 291 P. 926; Allen v. Garner, 45 U. 39, 143 P.
228; Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 U. 177, 27 P.2d 439; Blyth
& Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027; Henderson
v. Barnes, 27 U. 348, 75 P. 759. Rule 74(b) purports to
create the right to file a cross-appeal after the usual time
for filing an appeal has expired, although no such right
existed, and the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
such an appeal under former law. Clearly rule 74(b)
attempts to "extend" the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, "abridges" the substantive rights of Seagull concerning the right of Van Zyverdens to appeal and "enlarges" the substantive rights of Van Zyverdens with
respect to said appeal, and accordingly is invalid because
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it was promulgated in violation of and in excess of the
express limitation on rule-making power of the Supreme
Court specified in 78-2-4, UCA, 1953 (supra), and in
violation of the express prohibition contained in Rule 82,
URCP (supra) and would tend to construe the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure in such manner as to extend the
jurisdiction of the Court. The Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain Van Zyverdens' cross-appeal
except in accordance with the provisions of Rule 74(b),
and accordingly, since that rule is invalid and its promulgation vvas in excess of the power of the Court the crossappeal of Van Zyverdens should be dismissed.
POINT III
VAN ZYVERDENS' CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION BY REASON OF THE FAILURE TO FILE CROSS-APPEAL
WITHIN TIME SPECIFIED BY LAW.
Filing of notice of appeal within time required by law is
essential to clothe Supreme Court with jurisdiction to
adjudicate questions raised by the appeal. Anderson v.
Halthusen Mercantile Co., 30 U. 31, 83 P. 560; Johnson v.
Geary (supra) ;First Nat'l. Bank of Ogden v. Nielsen,
60 U. 227, 208 P. 522; Anderson v. Anderson, 3 U. (2d)
277, 282 P.2d 845. No notice of appeal was filed by Van
Zyverdens as required by the provisions of Rule 73 (b),
URCP. Van Zyverdens' attempt to cross-appeal pursuant
to Rule 74 (b), URCP, in their brief submitted October 4,
1963. Seagull's brief was filed September 6, 1963 and Van
Zyverdens' brief was accordingly due September 26, 1963.
(Rule 75(p) (1), URCP.) If in fact Van Zyverdens were

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

permitted under law to file a cross-appeal in their brief
(which we deny- see discussion under point II), the
time for Van Zyverdens to file their appeal would thereby
be extended until the due date of Van Zyverdens' brief.
Van Zyverdens failed to file their brief, containing said
purported cross-appeal, within the time provided by law.
The Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate
the questions raised by the cross-appeal because Van
Zyverdens' cross-appeal was not filed even within the
extended time mentioned in Rule 74, URCP.
After the time for filing of Van Zyverdens' cross-appeal
had passed they discovered this fact, and on the 2nd day
of October, 1963 obtained an order from the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court which purported to extend the time
for filing their brief and cross-appeal. Once the time for
appeal had expired the Supreme Court lost all j~risdiction
and has no power to consider the matters raised in the
cross-appeal. Rule 73 (a) , URCP. provides the only circumstances under which the Court may extend the time
for appealing, Which Rule 73(a) reads in part as follows:
" ... The time within which an appeal may be taken
shall be one month from the entry of the judgment
appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by
law, except that upon a showing of excusable neglect
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of
the judgment the district court in any action may
extend the time for appeal not exceeding one month
from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed.... " (Emphasis added)
The said order purporting to extend the time for Van
Zyverdens to file their cross-appeal was granted on
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grounds of mistake of law as to the period allowed for
filing a cross-appeal and was, and is, in excess of the
power of the Court, therefore it is void and of no effect
whatsoever. Mistake of law is not "excusable neglect."
Everyone is presumed to know the law.
The Supreme Court has held that neither Rule 6 (b),
granting the Court power to extend where a failure to
act in time is due to "excusable neglect" generally, nor
Rule 60 (b) ( 1) authorizing the Court to relieve from a
final judgment for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies where the appeal has not been taken in time, and
t~hat Rule 73 (a) quoted above prescribes the only circumstance under which the Court may extend the time
for filing an appeal. Anderson v. Anderson, supra. The
clear wording of Rule 73 (a) (supra) not only restricts the
right of the Court to extend time for filing an appeal to
situations where the appellant failed to discover the entry
of the judgment as a result of "excusable neglect," but
also states that such order must be made by the "District
Court," and does not authorize the Supreme Court to
make an order extending the time for filing of an appeal.
To permit the order signed by the Chief Justice, purporting to extend the time for filing the cross-appeal, to
confer jurisdiction upon the Court to hear the appeal after
the time for filing said appeal had expired, would be to
wholly disregard the clear meaning of Rule 82, URCP
(supra), which states that the rules of civil procedure
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the courts, and to disregard the limitation imposed by
78-2-4, UCA, 1953 (supra) on the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court, which statute expressly forbids the
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Supreme Court to promulgate rules which " ... abridge,
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant
... " If the Supreme Court has not and cannot make a rule
which permits it to extend the jurisdiction of the Court,
clearly the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be extended
b~' an order signed by a Justice thereof.
POINT IV
COURT'S DECISION THAT VAN ZYVERDENS'
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Van Zyverdens' entire case is founded upon their interpretation of the following wording contained in the
ranch real estate contract (R. 227) :
"It is agreed that the Highland milk base and all
milking equipment as mentioned above can be exchanged for livestock or horses of equal value remaining security for a period of two years as agreed
above."
It appears that a prior contract (R. 230-231) restricted the
transfer of the milk base (R. 606) until June, 1962 (R.
602, 638) and that by reason of that restriction a proposed
sale of the milk base to Pert was delayed. They contend
that all of the parties intended and agreed that the proposed beef operation was to be financed solely with proceeds from sale of the milk base and milking equipment,
that the parties intended the wording of the contract to
constitute an undertaking, warranty and guarantee by
sellers that the milk base could be conveyed to a third
party. that said conveyance was a condition precedent to
their obligations under purchase agreement, that their
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performance was excused until such conveyance could be
accomplished, and now claim $18,000.00 damages for alleged breach of contract, alleging that amount of loss of
anticipated profit, which they claim that they expected to
make during 1961 from the proposed beef operation (R.
4), however, this claim now seems to be reduced to
$9,000.00 (Van Zyverden brief, P. 26).
The Court very properly held that Van Zyverdens'
claim was not supported by the wording of the contract or
the evidence and awarded judgment against them for no
cause of action (R. 189).
The decision of the Court denying relief to Van Zyverdens is obviously correct and any one of the many legal
propositions andjor facts mentioned below and the answers to the propositions urged by Van Zyverdens, contained herein, are sufficient to affirm the decision of the
District ·court.
1. Is the contract ambiguous:

Authorities cited by Van Zyverdens' brief concerning
determination of intent of parties in interpreting contracts w·hich are ambiguous and therefore open to construction (brief P. 14-15) refer to obviously ambiguous
agreements. The permission granted to Van Zyverdens by
the contract to "exchange" the milk base and equipment
is clear and unambiguous. Van Zyverdens seek, by parol
testimony, to show that the clear wording is in fact
ambiguous and then seek to add to and vary the terms of
the written agreement by further parol evidence. They in
effect seek (a) a determination that the words "can be
exchanged" used in the contract (R. 227) are ambiguous,
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permitted under law to file a cross-appeal in their brief
(which we deny- see discussion under point II), the
time for Van Zyverdens to file their appeal would thereby
be extended until the due date of Van Zyverdens' brief.
Van Zyverdens failed to file their brief, containing said
purported cross-appeal, within the time provided by law.
The Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate
the questions raised by the cross-appeal because Van
Zyverdens' cross-appeal was not filed even within the
extended time mentioned in Rule 74, URCP.
After the time for filing of Van Zyverdens' cross-appeal
had passed they discovered this fact, and on the 2nd day
of October, 1963 obtained an order from the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court which purported to extend the time
for filing their brief and cross-appeal. Once the time for
appeal had expired the Supreme Court lost all jurisdiction
and has no power to consider the matters raised in the
cross-appeal. Rule 73 (a) , URCP, provides the only circumstances under which the Court may extend the time
for appealing, ~rhich Rule 73 (a) reads in part as follows:
" ... The time within which an appeal may be taken
shall be one month from the entry of the judgment
appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by
law, except that upon a showing of excusable neglect
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of
the judgment the district court in any action may
extend the time for appeal not exceeding one month
from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed.... " (Emphasis added)
The said order purporting to extend the time for Van
Zyverdens to file their cross-appeal was granted on
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grounds of mistake of law as to the period allowed for
filing a cross-appeal and was, and is, in excess of the
power of the Court, therefore it is void and of no effect
whatsoever. Mistake of law is not "excusable neglect."
Everyone is presumed to know the law.
The Supreme Court has held that neither Rule 6 (b),
granting the Court power to extend where a failure to
act in time is due to ''excusable neglect" generally, nor
Rule 60 (b) ( 1) authorizing the Court to relieve from a
final judgment for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies where the appeal has not been taken in time, and
t~hat Rule 73 (a) quoted above prescribes the only circumstance under which the Court may extend the time
for filing an appeal. Anderson v. Anderson, supra. The
clear wording of Rule 73 (a) (supra) not only restricts the
right of the Court to extend time for filing an appeal to
situations where the appellant failed to discover the entry
of the judgment as a result of "excusable neglect," but
also states that such order must be made by the "District
Court," and does not authorize the Supreme Court to
make an order extending the time for filing of an appeal.
To permit the order signed by the Chief Justice, purporting to extend the time for filing the cross-appeal, to
confer jurisdiction upon the Court to hear the appeal after
the time for filing said appeal had expired, would be to
wholly disregard the clear meaning of Rule 82, URCP
(supra), which states that the rules of civil procedure
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the courts, and to disregard the limitation imposed by
78-2-4, UCA, 1953 (supra) on the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court, which statute expressly forbids the
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Supreme Court to promulgate rules which " ... abridge,
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant
... " If the Supreme Court has not and cannot make a rule
which permits it to extend the jurisdiction of the Court,
clearly the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be extended
b~· an order signed by a Justice thereof.

POINT IV
COURT'S DECISION THAT VAN ZYVERDENS'
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Van Zyverdens' entire case is founded upon their interpretation of the following wording contained in the
ranch real estate contract (R. 227):
"It is agreed that the Highland milk base and all
milking equipment as mentioned above can be exchanged for livestock or horses of equal value remaining security for a period of two years as agreed
above."
It appears that a prior contract (R. 230-231) restricted the
transfer of the milk ·base (R. 606) until June, 1962 (R.
602, 638) and that by reason of that restriction a proposed
sale of the milk base to Pert was delayed. They contend
that all of the parties intended and agreed that the proposed beef operation was to be financed solely with proceeds from sale of the milk base and milking equipment,
that the parties intended the wording of the contract to
constitute an undertaking, warranty and guarantee by
sellers that the milk base could be conveyed to a third
party. that said conveyance was a condition precedent to
their obligations under purchase agreement, that their
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performance was excused until such conveyance could be
accomplished, and now claim $18,000.00 damages for alleged breach of contract, alleging that amount of loss of
anticipated profit, which they claim that they expected to
make during 1961 from the proposed beef operation (R.
4), however, this claim now seems to be reduced to
$9,000.00 (Van Zyverden brief, P. 26).
The Court very properly held that Van Zyverdens'
claim was not supported by the wording of the contract or
the evidence and awarded judgment against them for no
cause of action (R. 189).
The decision of the Court denying relief to Van Zyverdens is obviously correct and any one of the many legal
propositions andjor facts mentioned below and the answers to the propositions urged by Van Zyverdens, contained herein, are sufficient to affirm the decision of the
District Court.

1. Is the contract ambiguous:
Authorities cited by Van Zyverdens' brief concerning
determination of intent of parties in interpreting contracts which are ambiguous and therefore open to construction (brief P. 14-15) refer to obviously ambiguous
agreements. The permission granted to Van Zyverdens by
the contract to "exchange" the milk base and equipment
is clear and unambiguous. Van Zyverdens seek, by parol
testimony, to show that the clear wording is in fact
ambiguous and then seek to add to and vary the terms of
the written agreement by further parol evidence. They in
effect seek (a) a determination that the words "can be
exchanged" used in the contract (R. 227) are ambiguous,
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(b) to reform the contract to express the true agreement
between the parties and (c) to have the Court enforce the
reformed agreement and to thereby impose the affirmative duty and guarantee upon sellers to accomplish an
exchange of the milk base and (d) to excuse Van Zyverdens from all performance or payment of their obligations
under the contract until this has been accomplished.
All words and expressions used by the parties in a
contract must be given full force and effect, unless to do
so leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the ntanifest
purposes and intentions of the parties. Udy v. Jensen, 63
U. 94, 222 P. 597; Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 U. 207, 143 P.
234. The meanings of the words used by the parties are
clear. (Emphasis added)
(a) Meaning of "Can" (R. 227):

The word "can" has the same meaning as "may,''
Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank of Verdon v. USF&G
Co., 133 NW. 247, 248, 28 SD 315, 36 LRA NS 1152; Panatorium v. McLaughlin, Neb., 215 NW 798, 799; Sikes v.
State. 67 Ala. 77, 81, and the word "can" means to "give
permission." The word "can" has also been defined as
meaning 'possible," Ballantyne v. Rusk, 36 A. 361, 362, 84
Md. 649; "to be able/' Hannon v. Myrick, 111 A2d 729,
731, 118 Vt. 431, "to be enabled by law" and "to have a
right to," Bailey Realty & Loan Co. v. Bunting, 19 So. 2d
607. 608, 31 Ala. App 450, Town of Barton v. Town of
Albany, 189 A. 853, 856, 108 Vt. 531. No definitions of the
word '"can" have been located which expressly or by
implication mean "guarantee" or "warranty" as urged by
\Tan Zyverdens. The word "warranty" has essentially the
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same meaning as "guarantee" and in effect makes the
person giving the "warranty" an insurer. Obviously the
obligations of an insurer are not undertaken lightly, and
should not be imposed upon a person unless his intention
to assume such a vast and sweeping obligation is clear
from the plain wording of the contract.
In our situation the words "can be exchanged" in effect
give Van Zyverdens permission to exchange one type of
security for a different type of security in the event that
they desired to make the "exchange" and go into the
horse, sheep or livestock business (R. 539).
(b) Meaning of word "exchange":

Van Zyverdens take the position that the word "exchange" includes the right to sell for cash. It is true that
after the contract was executed the parties attempted to
sell the milk base for cash with an escrow of the proceeds
and to thereby modify the contract, however, that transaction was not completed and does not constitute a modification of the "exchange" provision of the contract and
does not change the clear meaning of the contract or
make it ambiguous. The alleged "contemporaneous" conduct referred to in the Van Zyverden brief (P. 16-22) is
actually the acts done by Farrar after the agreement was
signed to "go the second mile" and assist Van Zyverden
in attempting to sell the milk base for cash, even though
he had no obligation to do so under the terms of the
contract. There is simply no evidence to support the
theory of Van Zyverden that the attempted sale was
pursuant to the terms of the written agreement. Farrar
agreed to a sale of the milk base on terms different from
the "exchange" requirement of the contract and sent the
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letter (R. 246) to Hiland Dairy to carry out the terms of
their new agreement concerning the proposed cash sale
to Pert (R. 582).
The conduct of Farrar in ''going the second mile" to
assist Van Zyverden and the other conduct of the parties
does not indicate that word "exchange" had any meaning
to the parties other than its usual meaning. No "exchange'' proposal, which would comply with the terms of
the contract, was ever presented to the sellers, and accordingly Van Zyverdens cannot now complain that they
were deprived of the right to make a non-existent "exchange." Van Zyverdens ':vere not damaged by the failure
of the proposed cash sale to Pert since they were not
e!ltitled to insist on a sale for cash under the terms of the
contract.
The word ''exchange" has been uniformly defined by
the courts as meaning a transfer of property for property
or something of value other than money; Burger-Phillips
Co. v. Comm. of Int. Rev., CCA Ala., 126 F. 2d 934, 936,
and relates to the mutual giving and receiving of commodities without the intervention of money, U. S. v.
Paine, D.C. Mass., 31 F. Supp. 898, 900. A "sale" is a
transferring of goods for money, and an "exchange" is a
transferring of goods by way of barter. Dairymen's
League Co-op Ass'n. v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 8 NYS 2d 403, 412, Words and Phrases, Vol. 15A, P.
131 and cases there cited.
(c) Construing- ambiguous contracts:

If the contract is in fact ambiguous (which we deny) ,
since Van Zyverden selected the wording which he now
claims to be ambiguous (R. 505, 528, 551), any ambiguity
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contained therein is being construed most strongly against
Van Zyverdens. Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Co.,
120 U. 241, 233· P.2d 355; 26 ALR 2d 1131; Handley v.
Mutual L. Ins. Co., 106 U. 184, 147 P.2d 319; 152 ALR
1278; Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 236; 12 Am.
Jur. Contracts 252.
(d) Van Zyverden is an experienced realtor:

This common sense rule of construction against the
person who selected the language which that person now
contends is ambiguous is particularly applicable in our
case where Van Zyverden had 10 years experience in the
real estate business (R. 496, 558), in the preparation of
real estate contracts (R. 558) and the use of abstracts and
title insurance in connection with the verification of title
(R. 558-559).
(e) Certainty of Error required for reformation:

Where the contract is clear and unambiguous and all of
its terms are explicit and certain, as in our case, the contract is not open to construction, Burt v. Stringfellow,
supra. There is a presumption that the written contract
correctly evidences the agreement of the parties and
reformation will not be granted upon a probability and
usually not upon a mere preponderance of the evidence,
but only upon certainty of the error. Forrester v. Cook,
77 U. 137, 292 P. 206, 209; Weight v. Bailey, 45 U. 584, 147
P. 899; Cram v. Reynolds, 55 U. 384, 186 P. 100.

2. Is the question of ambigu~ty properly before the
Court:
Van Zyverdens' authorities, cited in support of the
proposition that the Court should inquire into the intent
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of the parties, all deal with situations where the contracts

being interpreted were obviously ambiguous and open to
construction by the Court. In our case we must go outside
of the four corners of the instrument if we are to show
any ambiguity since the wording in question, "can be
exchanged" is plain, simple and unambiguous.
The question of ambiguity appears to be an afterthought by Van Zyverdens' attorney after the trial since
the complaint and pre-trial order make no mention of
ambiguity, fraud or mistake. It appears from a review of
the Van Zyverden brief that their basic contention is to
the effect that the parties mistakenly used words in the
contract 'vhich did not convey the true intention of the
parties. and now seek to correct that alleged error by
asking the Court to interpret the language in such a
n1anner as to amount to a reformation, but seek to avoid
the burden of proof required, their failure to plead the
circumstances of fraud or mistake with particularity as
required by Rule 9(b), URCP, and their failure to frame
this as an issue in the pre-trial order by calling their
requested relief an interpretation of alleged ambiguous
wording in the contract rather than a reformation. The
Utah Supreme Court has long held that in the absence of
fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissable to
contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a
valid written instrument. Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 U. 279, 17 P.2d 294, 90 ALR 1299; Last Chance
Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P.2d 952. The matters
before the Court can be summarized as follows:
(a) Van Zyverdens' complaint:

The only allegation in Van Zyverdens' complaint re-
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garding the milk base reads as follows (R. 3, Par. 4):
"4. Defendants have failed and refused to allow plaintiffs to exchange the Highland milk base and milking
equipment for livestock or horses of equal value, as
provided in said contract, and have thereby breached
said contract." (Emphasis added)
The complaint obviously makes no reference to reformation of the contract, the alleged intent of the parties or
claim that this exchange is a condition precedent to their
obligations under the contract. The evidence shows that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action since it is
undisputed that the milking equipment was at all times
freely transferable (R. 230-231, 628), but no offers of
exchange of the equipment were ever presented (R. 553,
L. 17-23), although it was worth $1,850.00 (R. 524) and no
offers to exchange milk base were ever presented (R. 541,
L.i. 17-19); that Seagull and their assignor Farrars not only
did not "refuse to allow an exchange" as alleged in Van
Zyverdens' complaint, but both did everything in their
power to assist Van Zyverdens in arranging for a transfer
of the milk base on terms even more liberal than specified
in the contract (R. 541) and the milk base was actually
transferred to Van Zyverden about March 25, 1961 (R.
543). The alleged refusal of Seagull and Farrar to permit
an exchange as alleged in the complaint (R. 3, Par. 4) is
not supported by the evidence and judgment of no cause
of action is accordingly not only proper but required.
(b) The pre-trial order:

The issues before the Court as limited by the pre-trial
order (Rule 16, URCP) pertaining to Van Zyverdens'
claims are as follows (R. 181-182):
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"1. Were the defendants (Farrars & Seagull) obligated under the contract of sale within a reasonable
time after the date of the contract to permit the
exchange of the milk base therein mentioned or to
permit the Plaintiffs (Van Zyverdens) to exchange
the milk base for livestock or horses of equal value.

2. Did the Defendants have a duty to facilitate the
exchange."
3. Have the Plaintiffs been damaged thereby?
4. If so, in what amount." (Emphasis added)
The express wording of the pre-trial order limits the
issues to the obligations imposed "under the contract,''
and makes no mention of any "intent" of the parties
which is not expressed in the actual wording of the contract. The obligations mentioned in the pre-trial order
consist of a possible duty to "perm·~t the exchange" or a
possible "duty to facilitate the exchange." As demonstrated under paragraph 2 (a) above, Seagull and Farrars
have not only been willing at all times to permit the
exchange, but have also done everything in their power
to facilitate the exchange (R. 541). The question of damages would necessarily not arise unless there were a
breach of the duty mentioned in paragraphs 1 or 2 of the
pre-trial order (R. 181-182). It is clear that the Van
Zyverdens' claims as shown by the pre-trial order are
essentially the same as those contained in the complaint,
and that the evidence shows conclusively that no cause of
action exists under the Van Zyverden claims contained in
either the complaint or pre-trial order, and accordingly
the judgment of no cause of action against Van Zyverdens
should be affirmed.
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(c) Parol evidence rule:
Van Zyverdens' attempt to introduce oral testimony to
(1) show that the contract is ambiguous and (2) to
change the terms from mere permission for Van Zyverdens to make an exchange, to make sellers assume an
affirmative duty to make possible and guarantee that the
milk base could be exchanged or sold and to excuse Van
Zyverdens' performance of their obligations under the
purchase agreement until the sale could be accomplished.
The proposed oral evidence clearly violates the express
provisions of the parol evidence rule which has been codified as 78-25-16, UCA, 1953 and which reads as follows:
"there can be no evidence of the contents of a writing
other than the writing itself, except ... '' (certain
exceptions not pertinent herein follow).
The Utah Courts have long held that in the absence of
fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissable to
contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a
valid written instrument. Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre, Co., supra; Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson,
supra. The vast changes suggested by Van Zyverdens
certainly violate the express provisions of the above
quoted statute, and attempt to "contradict, vary and add
to" the terms of the contract (R. 226-227).
(d) Merger clause:

The real estate contract in question (R. 226-227) contains a merger clause (R. 226, Par. 20) which reads in
part as follows:
"20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by
the parties hereto ... that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties
hereto with reference to said property except as
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herein specifically set forth or attached heretonone."
Van Zyverden testified that he was familiar with the
contents of said merger clause and that he typed the word
"none'' in the blank at the end of the sentence (R. 559, L.
12-21), thus indicating that there were in fact no agreements between the parties other than those spelled out in
the contract and that any other conversations or agreements were deemed to be merged into the written instrument or abandoned. W·here the parties expressly agreed
to a merger clause their agreement should not be lightly
disturbed. Forrester v. Cook, supra.
The rule has long been established in Utah that where
parties have deliberately put their contract in writing,
and there is no uncertainty as to the extent of their
respective rights and obligations under the contract, it
cannot be overturned or varied by showing prior or contemporaneous oral agreements in conflict with or at
variance with the written instrument. McCormic v. Levy,
37 U. 134, 106 P. 660.
(e) Notice of restriction on milk base from chain of

title:
Van Zyverdens' argument concerning alleged misconduct of Farrar in concealing restriction on milk base is in
essence a charge of fraud (Brief, P. 18-22) used in inducing Van Zyverdens to purchase the ranch. They have not
pleaded fraud as required by Rule 9 (b), URCP, or set it
up as an issue in the pre-trial order and the alleged fraud
has not been proven by clear and convincing evidence as
required by law. Even if fraud were present and proved
(which we deny) , Van Zyverdens would still not be
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entitled to relief because they have constructive knowledge of the milk base restriction since it appears on the
fact of documents in the chain of title. They are not permitted to shut their eyes or ears to the inlet of information
and are charged with notice of all facts to which that
inquiry will lead when prosecuted in good faith and with
reasonable diligence. Texas Co. v. Aycock, 190 Tenn 16,
227 SW 2d 41, 17 ALR 2d 322 and cases there cited. Constructive notice is the same in effect as actual notice. Coal
Co. v. Doren, 142 U.S. 417; Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 21
Was 320, 55 P. 210; Universal CIT Corp. v. Courtesy
Motors, Inc., 8 U. 2d 275, 333' P.2d 628; McGarry v.
Thompson, 114 U. 442, 201 P.2d 288.
Van Zyverden, a realtor with 10 years experience (R.
496), who was familiar with the preparation of real estate
contracts (R. 558), the use of abstracts of title in connection with verification of title and with title insurance
(R. 558) and obviously well versed in real estate transactions, testified that he made no investigation of the
title to the ranch (R. 529), that he was aware of the
Michelsen contract (which contained the restriction on
the milk base) when the contract was executed (R. 529),
although he had previously testified to the contrary (R.
504) , that Farrar had the Michelsen contract in his hand
but that he did not ask to see it (R. 532-533). The slightest
effort to investigate title and the instruments in his actual
presence would have disclosed the restriction on milk
base, concerning which he now complains.
The facts that the wording of the Michelsen (R. 230231) and Van Zyverden (R. 226-227) contracts, pertaining to the milk base, are identical except for the period of
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the restriction; that the restrictions expired at the same
date and that the word "extension" is misspelled in both
contracts as "Extention" is strong evidence that Van
Zyverden probably actually copied the wording for his
contract from the Michelsen contract which contained the
milk base restriction which is the basis of his claims in
this lawsuit (R. 227 and 230).
The evidence and law discussed above show conclusively that Van Zyverdens have not pleaded or proven
a cause of action and that the District Court judgment of
no cause of action should be affirmed.

POINT V
VAN ZYVERDENS IN FACT SUFFERED NO DAMAGES FROM ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT.

The trial court very properly ruled that if Van Zyverdens were entitled to recover anything by reason of the
non-transferability of the milk base that it " ... would be
the value of the milk base itself ... " (R. 520), and rejected Van Zyverdens' offer of proof as to the profits
which they thought that they could have made from a
beef operation (R. 528) .
Related questions with respect to damages concerning:
adequacy of the offer of proof was discussed at page 11
of this brief, inconsistencies and wild assertions concerning anticipated profits contained in the offer of proof are
discussed at pages 6, 11, lack of intent to actually engage
in a beef operation at the time of execution of the contract
are discussed at pages 6, 10, and whether delay in exchanging milk base in fact prevented beef operation are
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discussed at page 9 and accordingly will not be repeated
here.
The profits (or losses) to be anticipated from conversion of a dairy into a new beef venture by persons who
apparently had no experience in raising beef would be at
best wildly speculative. Since the parties themselves
could not expect to reasonably foresee the income and
expenses to be expected from this new operation, certainly one party could not be heard to say that general
discussions concerning what they hoped to make (if there
were in fact any such discussions) would provide a sufficient basis for computing lost profits to ascertain damages
with reasonable certainty. (See rules and examples where
profits were easily determined, quoted at page 23 of Van
Zyverden brief.)
If in fact there was a breach of contract by reason of
the delay in transferring the milk base (which we deny),
the damages, if any, resulting therefrom could easily be
ascertained. If the sale to Pert had been completed as
contemplated, the $3',190.00 (R. 547) received therefrom
would have been released from escrow and made available to Van Zyverdens about May 1, 1961 (R. 505). The
restrictions on transferability of the milk base were removed on June 15, 1962 (R. 560, 602). Interest is the exclusive measure of damages for breach of contract to pay
or for the detention of money. Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13,
40 P.2d 198 at Page 202. At the most Van Zyverdens were
deprived of the use of $3,190.00 from May 1, 1961 to June
15, 1962, and accordingly would at the most be entitled to
recover interest of $208.77 computed at legal rate of 6%
per annum, however, because of a change in policy by
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Hiland Dairy, the milk base was 360 pounds and at $10.00
per pound (R. 547) was worth $3,600.00 on June 15, 1962,
and at the time of the trial (R. 549). Van Zyverdens accordingly made a profit of $410.00 on the value of the base
by waiting to dispose of it, and after deducting the
interest of $208.77 due for loss of use of the funds as
aforesaid, Van Zyverdens actually had a profit of $201.23.
The Court must consider all circumstances which may
have occurred to the date of the trial in measuring damages, whether such circumstances increase or reduce the
amount of damages. (61 ALR 126, s. 100 ALR 1201.) The
evidence clearly shows that Van Zyverdens actually sustained no legally recoverable damages from the restrictions upon transfer of the milk base, even if that issue had
been properly before the Court, which it was not as
discussed above.
The assertion by Van Zyverdens at page 27 that they
are entitled to recover $13,812.49 allegedly invested by
them in the property is not an issue in Van Zyverdens'
complaint, the pre-trial order or the trial of the case, and
there is no evidence in the case to support the amounts
claimed or Van Zyverdens' allegation that the property is
now worth $85,000.00. Obviously $5,000.00 of the amount
claimed to have been invested in the ranch constitutes
credit allowed to Van Zyverdens for some equipment and
livestock which they were supposed to bring on the property as additional security, but most of which has now
disappeared if it in fact was ever brought to the property.
Van Zyverdens still haYe exactly the same equipment and
livestock as they had before the transaction, except to the
extent that they have disposed of it. The additional
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amounts claimed by Van Zyverdens undoubtedly represents operating and maintenance costs allegedly expended
on the property which are detailed in their offer of proof
made after the trial which was rejected by the Court.
(R. 219-220.)
The assertion by Van Zyverdens that the transferability
of the milk base was a condition precedent to their obligation to perform their obligations under the purchase
contract and excused them from performing until that
condition was met (page 25 of Van Zyverden brief) is so
unreasonable that it is hardly worth considering. If this
theory were carried to its logical conclusion, Van Zyverdens would have us believe that Farrar was so anxious to
sell them the ranch with no down payment and nothing
to be paid for over a year that they agreed to finance their
operation by permitting the liquidation of part of the
ranch assets, and agreed that if the assets could not be
liquidated that Van Zyverdens would be entitled to retain
the farm without paying for it or being required to pay
the taxes, water assessments, insure the buildings, etc.
Obviously no one would sell a $55,000.00 farm on such
terms.
The value of the milk base is approximately lj2 of 1%
of the purchase price of the ranch. The Utah Supreme
Court considered a similar situation involving a sewer
connection that had not been made, the cost of which was
about 1f2 of 1% of the purchase price of the house, in
Erisman v. Overman, 11 U. 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85, and denied
equitable relief because there was an adequate legal
remedy available, and stated that "If there is a legal
remedy available to which resort may be had without sub-
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stantial, irreparable damage, one may not seek equity."
The Court also stated that "Equity will not pick up pins."
The rule is well established that where payments are to
be made in installments and the conveyance is not to be
made until full payment (as in our case), the promise to
pay is unconditional except as to the last payment. 55 Am.
Jur. vendor and purchaser 102, 106; Crampton v. McLaughlin Realty Co., 99 P. 586 (Wash. 1909). See also
discussion at pages 682-686 of record.
Van Zyverdens obtained funds or credit necessary to
purchase 25 cows in the spring of 1961, yet claim that
they were prevented from going into the beef business
because they were not permitted the use of $3,190.00 for
a little over a year. This argument is also obviously
unsound. Van Zyverdens got what they bargained for but
were unable to pay. They have retained possession of the
use of and the income from the ranch since September,
1960, without paying anything toward the purchase price,
taxes, water assessments or insurance, and now they
claim that they have been damaged.
POINT VI
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN ITS APPEAL BRIEF ON FILE HEREIN.
Most of the matters mentioned by Van Zyverdens in
their points IV and V have been fully covered in the
original brief filed by Seagull and will not be discussed
herein, however, it is proper to reply to a few of the
matters mentioned by Van Zyverdens.
Seagull generally agrees with the law as stated by Van
Zyverdens in their reply brief, however, their application
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of the facts to the law is disputed. Van Zyverdens have
had much to say about Seagull filing a supplemental
complaint, however, their argument is essentially that
Seagull should have asked for permission to file a supplemental complaint (Van Zyverden brief, Pages 33, 39-43)
rather than for permission to amend the pleadings to refer
to the later notice (R. 233-240) as was done by Seagull
when Van Zyverdens objected to admission of the second
notice as being outside the scope of the pleadings (R.
545). Whether the amendment under Rule 15, URCP, is
called an amendment or a supplemental pleadings seems
unimportant. The fact is that Seagull asked to be permitted to refer in its pleadings to the second notice, if the
Court was of the opinion that said second notice was
outside the scope of the pleadings and issues in the case.
Van Zyverdens agree that no good purpose could be
accomplished by a new action based upon the same facts
to recover possession of the ranch. (Van Zyverden brief,
Pages 39-42.) This Court has the power to admit exhibit 5
(R. 233-240) into evidence without further hearings
before the District Court. There can be no question that
based upon notice contained in said exhibit 5 (R. 233240) Seagull is entitled to the relief requested in its
appeal brief on file herein, and judgment should be entered accordingly, and a new trial or hearing should be
ordered to receive evidence as to the service of said
exhibit 5, the amount to be allowed as attorney fees, etc.
The arguments raised by Van Zyverdens as to alleged
waiver of the notice contained in exhibit 5 (R. 233-240)
because of statements contained in and legal theories advanced in other litigation allegedly filed in the District

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
Court (Van Zyverden brief, P. 41) are not before the
Court, and accordingly the position of Van Zyverdens is
wholly unsupported by the evidence and the record and
cannot be considered. The copies of notices allegedly
served upon Van Zyverdens (R. 725-726, 729) are not
properly a part of the record in this case for the reason
that the motion to which they are attached was filed after
the appeal was taken in this case, and after the District
Court lost jurisdiction in this matter. Petersen v. Ohio
Copper Co., 71 U. 444, 266 P. 1050. In any event, said
notices expressly state that Seagull does not thereby
waive any rights which may have accrued by reason of or
in connection with prior notices served, legal proceedings
pending concerning the property described therein and
cannot constitute a waiver since a waiver requires the
voluntary relinquishment of a known legal right and
requires consideration to support the waiver contract.
56 Am. Jur. Waiver, 12-16. The authorities cited by Van
Zyverdens (Van Zyverden Brief, Page 35) are not in
point since they contemplate a situation where both parties treated the contract as in full force and effect,
whereas the notices in question expressly state that no
waiver is intended. The legal position taken by Seagull in
the two notices mentioned (R. 725-726, 729) is not inconsistent with the remedies sought in this action. If Van
Zyverdens are in fact tenants at will by reason of the first
notice (R. 266-272) served upon them as contended by
Van Zyverdens (brief page 31) , certainly so long as they
remained tenants at will of the property any number of
new notices could be serVed demanding that they vacate
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or be guilty of unlawful detainer, and each new notice
would give rise to a new cause of action. The mention of
Van Zyverdens as "buyers" in said notices was merely
descriptive of their connection with the real estate contract in the first instance, and was not a recognition of a
status which then existed.
T!he claim of Van Zyverdens that Seagull had been
defaulted at the time the requests for admissions were
served in case number 2456 is obviously untrue since
Seagull was the plaintiff in that action and the only default entered therein was the default certificate against
Van Zyverdens for their failure to deny the requests for
admissions. See discussion at pages 6-8 of Seagull appeal
brief on file herein. Denial of motion for summary judgment by Judge Tuckett obviously does not bind this
Court.
The assertion by Van Zyverdens that Seagull elected at
the pre-trial conference to proceed in tort and to abandon
its other claims is simply not true. Judge Tuckett suggested the possibility of proceeding as a mortgage foreclosure and his offer was declined, Seagull electing to
proceed under the theories set out in its pleadings. The
question of Seagull's right to recover attorney fees is a
matter of law under the terms of the contract between
the parties and any views expressed by Judge Tuckett
with respect thereto would not bind this Court. Van
Zyverdens' view that termination of the buyers' interest
t;nder the real estate contract (R. 226-227) also terminates the right of the seller to collect attorney fees in
connection with the action and in accordance with the
express agreement of the parties is contrary to reason and
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would amount to the Court's remaking the contract for
the parties.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is obvious that Van Zyverdens have failed to state a
claim for relief upon which relief can be granted either in
their pleadings or the pre-trial order and that the propositions urged by Van Zyverdens are unrealistic and
merely delaying tactics. On the other hand, Seagull
should be awarded restitution of the ranch and damages
by reason of Van Zyverdens' occupation thereof since
September, 1960, without paying any of his obligations
under the contract or any part of the purchase price.
Because of the severe damages being sustained by
Seagull as a result of Van Zyverdens' appropriation of
their property without compensation, it is strongly urged
that restitution be ordered by this Court rather than
delaying matters with further hearings concerning that
issue in the District Court and the further delay of possible additional appeals to this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for Seagull Investment Co.
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